Which approach to justice is aristotle associated with

Few would doubt that justice is a virtue of character. But there are other moral virtues. How is justice related to them? Is it more important? Likewise, though the texts we have show Aristotle devoting more space to justice, it is not clear that the particular form of the virtue of justice has any sort of pre-eminence. If we take virtue of character to have the moral centrality the ancients perhaps in contrast to the moderns , how much importance should we accord to justice among the virtues?

He takes it that justice is preeminent over the moral virtues because it inheres in the rational part of the soul, and because its object is more noble the good of others, or the common good, rather than the individual good.

On that point he can agree with Cicero. However, these virtues themselves are not as excellent as the theological virtues, of which the greatest is love or charity -- caritas; ST II-II In recent decades there have been secular challenges to the primacy of justice among virtues. Instead of a rights-based understanding of morality that gave special consideration to the individual, women saw relationships between people as primary Gilligan , pp.

Following Gilligan, she sees much ethical theory as missing a feminine voice, one which grounds moral concern for the concrete other in caring for them and their needs, and thus as relational rather than individualistic Noddings , Yet some caution is required before seeing her as taking up something like a Thomistic stance on the priority of love over justice. For one thing, to a significant degree she wants to emphasize the importance of the concrete and particular as opposed to the abstract and general or the reliance on universal principles in thinking and acting morally.

But that is an emphasis which animates some particularistic forms of virtue ethics, and does not distinguish justice from love or other virtues. Thus she does not clearly take a side in this matter. Like Noddings, Virginia Held frames much of the point of the ethics of care against a historical theoretical backdrop of attention to justice Held , , To some extent, like Noddings, for Held the relevant notion of justice is not a virtue of character but a concern with fairness, equality, and individual rights, or perhaps more generally impartial universal principles Held , p.

In fact, Held more clearly poses an ethics of care as an alternative to virtue ethics Held , ; , This is for two reasons. First, virtue ethical theories focus on dispositions and traits of individuals, whereas an ethics of care focuses on relations between individuals.

Second, an ethics of care sees people as partially constituted by their relations with others, as opposed to the individualism characteristic of virtue ethics. Held does not think an ethics of care can do without a concern for justice as a value, however Held , Margaret McLaren , on the other hand, responds on the basis of commonalities between care ethics and virtue ethics that care ethics actually is most attractive when situated as an ethics of virtue.

As he has developed his view, empathic motivation has come to take an increasing role Slote , p. As with Noddings and Held, for Slote the relevant questions about justice are about forms of social organization, the allocation of rights, and so on. But empathy is the focal normative concern throughout. The justice of a society constitutively depends on the motives of the individuals who make it up Slote , p.

That is, individuals would count as just exactly to the degree that their motivations are empathic, and they thus contribute to the laws, policies, institutions, and so on in ways that are reflective of similar motivations across society.

But that is just to say that they are caring motivations as well. A somewhat different feminist critique of a focus on a virtue of justice comes from Robin Dillon. Like Slote, her concern is more with social institutions, structures, and hierarchies than with traits of character, and in fact these priorities lead her to be critical of virtue ethical theories which, she believes, cannot ask the right questions about virtues and vices Dillon , p. However, she does accept the point that character traits matter, though she believes attending to the vices that allow and support social structures that allow for oppression and domination is more pertinent to feminist moral philosophy.

Lisa Tessman, on the other hand, accepts the basic framework of Aristotelian thinking about virtues of character, and with it the virtue of justice Tessman One point of amendment, then, to Aristotelian thought is to recognize that oppressive social conditions may make other traits — traits that are important for liberatory struggle — into virtues.

Another, congruent with other lines of feminist critique, is that Aristotle is insufficiently appreciative of the need for sensitivity to and response to suffering, so that something like the kind of supplementation recommended by care ethics is appropriate. Brewer believes that a robust conception of the virtue of justice does important work for such a theory, not just focusing on distribution and allocation, but more generally establishing the space for virtuous recognition of ways that others can demand that we treat them Brewer , p.

Still, Brewer invokes Aquinas to argue that such justice is not enough, that that what is required is a recognition of a virtue of love to unify and perfect the other virtues of character. These strategies vary across both dimensions we have considered, taking with various degrees of seriousness the connection between institutional and personal forms of justice, and focusing on the latter as a virtue, among and like other virtues.

However, Drydyk emphasizes justice as a virtue of individuals, rather than institutions or societies. Thus, the threat of unjust — vicious -- wronging hangs not only over people who are sufficiently cognitively impaired so as not to perceive insults, but also corpses, animals, and even rare and valuable rock formations p. David Schmidtz and John Thrasher suggest rethinking the relationship between social justice and individual justice Schmidtz and Thrasher On their view this is largely a matter of compliance with rules and institutions that enable people to live in harmony and flourish together.

An alternative proposal for thinking of the justice as a personal virtue ties it intimately to the experiences we have as emotional creatures. There are also recent ventures in the spirit of the ancient Greek thinking about the individual virtue of justice. Rasmussen and Den Uyl argue for two interpersonal senses of justice pp. One is the familiar Aristotelian virtue. The second of these senses of interpersonal justice does not draw its content from the exercise of virtue, but rather makes a place for it.

The former does depend on virtue overall including the exercise of practical wisdom for its demands, but these are construed broadly in the traditional way of rendering to each his due. Bloomfield similarly suggests extending the Aristotelian virtue of justice, but in an inward direction, arguing that self-respect is necessary for happiness, and treating oneself fairly requires treating oneself fairly, as one treats others fairly, as a property of justice as individuals.

On the other hand, Wolterstorff argues that the eudaimonism of Greek thought prevents a proper appreciation for the nature and significance of justice and rights.

Whether there is theoretical space remaining for a virtue of justice is not a question Wolterstorff considers, but he does believe there is no hope for an adequate grip on justice in an Aristotelian or Stoic framework. Recent thinkers have grappled with the question of priority between formal principle and virtue that vexed Aristotle, and offered solutions that for the most part subordinate the virtue of justice to the prior notion of the justice of distributions, as Aristotle himself seems to have suggested.

Bernard Williams claims explicitly that this is so Williams , p. To do so, Wiggins distinguishes three senses of justice: A a matter of outcomes or states of affairs in which each gets what is due; B a disposition to promote justice A ; C a condition of the polis in virtue of which A is realized. Wiggins claims that the proper outcome of this collision of conceptions is one that recognizes a form of logical priority of justice A over justice B p.

And in fact he claims that a necessary condition on acts and outcomes satisfying the norms of justice A is that they be recognized to be so by those with the virtue of justice B.

But, as merely formal, that tells us nothing about the substantive content of that norm. To get that, we have ineliminable need to refer to the judgment of the person with justice B. LeBar , takes a similar tack in attempting to incorporate Kantian and post-Kantian insights into just demands on the treatment of others into an Aristotelian virtue framework. On his view, there is no way to specify the contents of the demands of justice, or to spell out its norms, independently of the wider possession and exercise of the virtues, including the virtue of practical wisdom.

At the same time, what the virtuous and just person sees, in inhabiting a social world with equals in moral standing, are the norms which have become associated with the liberal conception: the standing to obligate others and hold them accountable, for example.

Finally, all of these are Western treatments of an individual virtue of justice. May Sim Sim , makes the case that there are informative parallels between the Confucian treatment of the virtues in particular, yi and the virtue of justice as adumbrated in Plato and Aristotle.

There are many different conceptions of the virtue of justice, and only some of them are distinctively virtue ethical. Many non-virtual ethical approaches put forward theories of virtue, and what distinguishes them from virtue ethics is that the given theory of virtue comes later in the order of explanation, rather than itself serving as the basis for understanding all of morality.

This is especially the case with justice, where as we have seen it is naturally tempting to account for the norms of justice first and derive an account of the virtue in light of those norms. The question of the priority of norms of justice or the virtue of justice is likely to continue to generate exploration and debate, as is the question of how our lives as social and political animals contributes to understanding the virtue of justice.

These vexed questions have inspired a profusion of views and no doubt will continue to do so. History 1. Social Psychology and Justice 3. Justice as a Virtue of Societies 4. Justice and other Virtues 5. Recent Developments 6.

Social Psychology and Justice 20th-century developmental psychology drew deeply on the Kantian legacy. Justice as a Virtue of Societies For a variety of reasons, many ethical thinkers have thought that justice cannot be based in sentiment but requires a more intellectually constructive rational ist basis, and in recent times this view of the matter seems to have been held, most influentially, by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.

Justice and Other Virtues Few would doubt that justice is a virtue of character. Conclusion There are many different conceptions of the virtue of justice, and only some of them are distinctively virtue ethical. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , translated by W. Beijing: Shanlian Bookstore Publishing House.

Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science. Oxford: University California Press. Gerasimos S Goodness and Justice—Plato, Aristotle, and Moderns. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. Gusejnof A, Yrrlytets G Liu Xianzhou, et al. Beijing: Renmin University Press. Hegel G W F Hegel G W F a. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. Hegel G W F b. Haldane and Frances H Simson. Hutchinson D S The Virtues of Aristotle.

Jackson MW Matters of Justice. Britain: Billing Sons Limited, Worcester. Kant I He Zhaowu. Beijing: Commercial Press. The Metaphysics of Moral trans. Li Mei Miller D Social Justice Principles. Cambridge, Mass. Toward Justice and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The problem may be with the difference principle itself. It is not at all clear that rational agents in a hypothetical original position would adopt such an egalitarian principle. Thus we could satisfactorily specify the requirements of an essentially Kantian conception of justice, as requiring respect for the dignity of all persons as free and equal, rational moral agents.

While less egalitarian than what Rawls offers, it might prove an attractive alternative. To what extent should liberty be constrained by equality in a just society? This is a central issue that divides him from many post-Rawlsians, to a few of whom we now briefly turn.

They will represent six different approaches. We shall consider, in succession, 1 the libertarian approach of Robert Nozick, 2 the socialistic one of Kai Nielsen, 3 the communitarian one of Michael Sandel, 4 the globalist one of Thomas Pogge, 5 the feminist one of Martha Nussbaum, and 6 the rights-based one of Michael Boylan. As this is merely a quick survey, we shall not delve much into the details of their theories limiting ourselves to a single work by each or explore their applications or do much in the way of a critique of them.

But the point will be to get a sense of several recent approaches to developing views of justice in the wake of Rawls. Both are fundamentally committed to individual liberty. First, anyone who justly acquires any holding is rightly entitled to keep and use it. Second, anyone who acquires any holding by means of a just transfer of property is rightly entitled to keep and use it.

It is only through some combination of these two approaches that anyone is rightly entitled to any holding. But some people acquire holdings unjustly—e. So, third, justice can require the rectification of unjust past acquisitions.

People should be entitled to use their own property as they see fit, so long as they are entitled to it. Whereas capitalism supports the ownership and control of the means of producing and distribution material goods by private capital or wealth, socialism holds that they should be owned and controlled by society as a whole.

If Nozick accuses Rawls of going too far in requiring a redistribution of wealth, Nielsen criticizes him for favoring individual liberty at the expense of social equality. His sharper departure from Rawls can be found in his second principle, which is to replace the difference principle that allegedly justified socio-economic in equality.

Sandel, as a communitarian, argues against Rawls and Nozick that the well-being of a community takes precedence over individual liberty and against Nielsen over the socio-economic welfare of its members. More specifically, it not only accepts the difference principle but wants to apply it on an international level as well as nationally. But, as applied internationally, it is not. While Rawls does believe that well-off societies have a duty to assist burdened societies, he rejects the idea of a global application of his difference principle.

What Pogge is proposing is a global egalitarian principle of distributive justice. If it uses those extracted resources itself, it must pay the tax itself. If it sells some to other societies, presumably at least part of the tax burden will be borne by buyers in the form of higher sales prices. Corporations extracting resources such as oil companies and coal mining companies would pay their taxes to their governments which, in turn, would be responsible for transferring funds to disadvantaged societies to help the global poor.

At any rate, they should be channeled toward societies in which they could improve the lot of the poor and disadvantaged. Of course, less well-off societies would be free to refuse such funds, if they so chose. But, one might wonder, would well-off societies only be motivated to pay their fair share by benevolence, a sense of justice, and possible shame at being exposed for not doing so? All of these capabilities are essential to our functioning as flourishing human beings and should be assured for all citizens of a just society.

But, historically, women have been and still are short-changed with respect to them and should be guaranteed their protection in the name of justice Sex , pp.

There are two levels of basic goods. The most deeply embedded of these, such as food, clothing, shelter, protection from physical harm, are absolutely necessary for any meaningful human action. The second level of basic goods comprises less deeply embedded ones, such as basic knowledge and skills such as are imparted by education, social structures that allow us to trust one another, basic assurance that we will not be exploited, and the protection of basic human rights.

Next, there are three levels of secondary goods. The more deeply embedded goods are as conditions of meaningful human action, the more right to them people have. Boylan follows Kant and Rawls in holding an ultimate moral imperative is that individual human agents and their rights must be respected.

This is a matter of justice, distributive justice involving a fair distribution of social goods and services and retributive justice involving proper ways for society to treat those who violate the rules. A just society has a duty to provide basic goods equally to all of its members, if it can do so. But things get more complicated with regards to secondary goods. A just society will try to provide the first level of secondary goods, those that are life enhancing, equally to all its members.

Yet this becomes more problematic with the second and third levels of secondary goods—those that are useful and luxurious—as the conditions for meaningful human action have already been satisfied by more deeply embedded ones. The need that people have to derive rewards for their work commensurate with their achievement would seem to militate against any guarantee of equal shares in these, even if society could provide them, although comparable achievement should be comparably rewarded.

Finally, in the area of retributive justice, we may briefly consider three scenarios. First, when one person takes a tangible good from another person, justice requires that the perpetrator return to the victim some tangible good s of comparable worth, plus compensation proportionate to the harm done the victim by the loss.

Second, when one person takes an intangible good from another person, justice requires that the perpetrator give the victim some tangible good as adequate compensation for the pain and suffering caused by the loss. And, third, when one person injures another person through the deprivation of a valued good that negatively affects society, society can justly incarcerate the perpetrator for a period of time proportionate to the loss Society , pp. In conclusion, we might observe that, in this rights-based alternative, as in the previous five the libertarian, the socialistic, the communitarian, the globalist, and the feminist we have considered, there is an attempt to interpret justice as requiring respect for the dignity of all persons as free and equal, rational moral agents.

This historical survey has tracked the progressive development of this Kantian idea as becoming increasingly prominent in Western theories of justice. Wayne P. Pomerleau Email: Pomerleau calvin. Western Theories of Justice Justice is one of the most important moral and political concepts.

Aristotle After working with Plato at his Academy for a couple of decades, Aristotle was understandably most influenced by his teacher, also adopting, for example, a virtue theory of ethics. Augustine Aurelius Augustine was born and raised in the Roman province of North Africa; during his life, he experienced the injustices, the corruption, and the erosion of the Roman Empire.

Early Modernity Although only half as much time elapses between Aquinas and Hobbes as did between Augustine and Aquinas, from the perspective of intellectual history, the period of modernism represents a staggering sea-change.

Hobbes Whereas Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas all offer accounts of justice that represent alternatives to Sophism, Thomas Hobbes, the English radical empiricist, can be seen as resurrecting the Sophist view that we can have no objective knowledge of it as a moral or political absolute value.

Hume As a transition between Hobbes and Hume, brief mention can be made of John Locke, the most important political philosopher between them. Contemporary Philosophers From its founding, American political thought had an enduring focus on justice. References and Further Readings a. William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, S. Indianapolis: Hackett, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica , trans.

Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Vol. New York: Benziger Brothers, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , trans. Aristotle, On Rhetoric , trans. George A. New York: Oxford University Press, Aristotle, Politics , trans. Augustine, The City of God , trans. London: Penguin Books, Augustine, Of True Religion , trans. Chicago: Henry Regnery, Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will , trans. Augustine, Political Writings , trans. Michael W. Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law , ed.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , ed. Edwin Curley. Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen , ed. David Hume, Political Essays , ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, David Fate Norton and Mary J.

Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy , trans. James W. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics , trans. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice , trans. Immanuel Kant, Political Writings , trans. Nisbet, ed. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government , ed. Karl Marx, Selected Writings , ed.

Lawrence H. John M. Robson and Bruce L. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Mineola, NY: Dover, Cleveland: World Publishing Company, This anthology also contains some Bentham and some Austin.

Social Theory and Practice , Vol. New York: Basic Books, Martha C. Plato, Five Dialogues , trans. Plato, Gorgias , trans. Donald J. Plato, The Laws , trans. Trevor J. Plato, Republic , trans. Grube, revised by C. Thomas W. Philosophy and Public Affairs , Vol. John Rawls, Collected Papers , ed. New York: Columbia University Press, Michael J. New York: Cambridge University Press, Robin Waterfield, trans.

Shaw, ed. This is a good collection of contemporary readings, especially one by Kai Nielsen. Jonathan Barnes, ed. Brian Barry, Justice and Impartiality. This is a good study. Brian Barry, Theories of Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press, This discussion makes up in depth what it lacks in breadth. Hugo A. Bedau, ed. This is an old but still valuable anthology. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H.

Smith, ed. Beitz, being particularly provocative. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving.

Samuel Freeman, ed. Like all the books in this series, this one offers a fine array of critical articles, with the one by Martha C. Nussbaum being particularly noteworthy. John-Stewart Gordon, ed. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, There is a reply by Boylan. Richard Kraut, ed. See, in particular, the articles by John M. Cooper and Kraut himself. Rex Martin and David A. Reidy, ed. Oxford: Blackwell, David Miller, Principles of Social Justice. This is a good contemporary treatment.

David Fate Norton, ed. Pogge, Realizing Rawls. Louis P. Pojman, Global Political Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill, The fifth chapter focuses on justice.

Pomerleau, Twelve Great Philosophers. New York: Ardsley House, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, An interesting collection, with a particularly penetrating article by Kai Nielsen. Henry S. This is a very good overview article. Paul Ricoeur, The Just , trans. David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, This is interesting as a contemporary treatment from the continental tradition. Allen D. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, This is a valuable, in-depth analysis.

Alan Ryan, ed. This is a very good anthology of classical and contemporary readings. Sandel, ed. This is an in-depth examination of Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian views. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice. This is a wide-ranging recent study. John Skorupski, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy, ed. This is a nice and well-organized collection of classical and contemporary texts. James P. Sterba, The Demands of Justice.

This is a good monograph. Sterba, ed.